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In decision from experience, the source of probability information affects how probability
is distorted in the decision task. Understanding how and why probability is distorted is a
key issue in understanding the peculiar character of experience-based decision. We con-
sider how probability information is used not just in decision-making but also in a wide
variety of cognitive, perceptual, and motor tasks. Very similar patterns of distortion of prob-
ability/frequency information have been found in visual frequency estimation, frequency
estimation based onmemory, signal detection theory, and in the use of probability informa-
tion in decision-making under risk and uncertainty. We show that distortion of probability
in all cases is well captured as linear transformations of the log odds of frequency and/or
probability, a model with a slope parameter, and an intercept parameter.We then consider
how task and experience inﬂuence these two parameters and the resulting distortion of
probability.We review how the probability distortions change in systematic ways with task
and report three experiments on frequency distortion where the distortions change sys-
tematically in the same task. We found that the slope of frequency distortions decreases
with the sample size, which is echoed by ﬁndings in decision from experience.We review
previous models of the representation of uncertainty and ﬁnd that none can account for
the empirical ﬁndings.
Keywords: log odds, subjective probability, probability distortion, frequency estimation, decision-making,
uncertainty
Estimates of the frequency of events by human observers are typi-
cally distorted. InFigure 1Awe re-plot data fromoneof the earliest
reports of this phenomenon (Attneave, 1953). Attneave asked par-
ticipants to estimate the relative frequency of English letters in
text and Figure 1A is a plot of their frequency estimates versus
actual frequency. Although participants had considerable expe-
rience with English text, the estimates were markedly distorted,
with the relative frequency of rare letters overestimated, that of
common letters, underestimated.
Such S-shaped distortions1 of relative frequency and probabil-
ity are found in many research areas including decision under risk
(for reviews see Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Luce, 2000), visual per-
ception (Pitz, 1966; Brooke and MacRae, 1977; Varey et al., 1990),
memory (Attneave, 1953; Lichtenstein et al., 1978), and movement
planning under risk (Wu et al., 2009, 2011).
Figure 1B shows an example from decision under risk (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992). Different participants in the same experi-
ment can have different distortions (Gonzalez andWu, 1999; Luce,
2000) and a single participant can exhibit different distortion pat-
terns in different tasks (Brooke and MacRae, 1977;Wu et al., 2009)
1We use the term “distortion” to cover transformations in probability or relative
frequency implicit in tasks involving probability or relative frequency. We use “S-
shaped”to refer to both S-shaped and inverted-S-shaped. Precisely,Attneave’s (1953)
case is an inverted-S-shaped distortion.
or in different conditions of a single task (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992). We currently do not know what controls probability distor-
tion or why it varies as it does. Gonzalez and Wu (1999) identiﬁed
this issue as central to research on decision under risk.
We use a two-parameter family of transformations to char-
acterize the distortions of frequency/probability. This family of
distortion functions is deﬁned by the implicit equation,
Lo
(
π
(
p
)) = γ Lo (p) + (1 − γ) Lo (p0
)
(1)
where p denotes true frequency/probability, π(p) denotes the
corresponding distorted frequency/probability estimate and,
Lo(p) = log p
1 − p (2)
is the log odds (Barnard, 1949) or logit function (Berkson, 1944).
The transformation is an S-shaped curve (examples shown in both
panels of Figure 2).
The two parameters of the family are readily interpretable. The
parameter γ in Eq. 1 is the slope of the linear transformation and
the remaining parameter p0 is the “ﬁxed point”of the linear trans-
formation, the value of p which is mapped to itself. To show this,
we need only set p = p0 and simplify to get,
Lo
(
π
(
p0
)) = γ Lo (p0
) + (1 − γ) Lo (p0
) = Lo (p0
)
. (3)
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FIGURE 1 | S-shaped distortions of frequency estimates. (A) Estimated
relative frequencies of occurrence of English letters in text plotted versus
actual relative frequency from Attneave (1953). (B) Subjective probability of
winning a gamble (decision weight) plotted versus objective probability
fromTversky and Kahneman (1992). R2 denotes the proportion of variance
accounted by the ﬁt.
FIGURE 2 | Demonstration of the effects of varying the parameters γ
and p0.The parameter p0 in the LLO function is the “ﬁxed point” of the
transformation, the value of p which is mapped to itself. The parameter γ, is
the slope of the linear transformation on log odds scales, and on linear
scales, is the slope of the curve at the crossover point p0. Left: p0 ﬁxed at
0.4 and γ varied between 0.2 and 1.8. Note that the line at γ=1 overlaps
with the diagonal line, i.e., no distortion of probability. Right: γ ﬁxed at 0.6
and p0 varied between 0.1 and 0.9.
Since Lo() is invertible, π(p0)= p0. We refer to p0 as the
crossover point.
In Figure 2 we illustrate more generally how the two parame-
ters affect the shape of the distortion function, plotting π against
p on linear scales. The transformation maps 0–0, 1–1, and p0 to
p0. At point (p0, p0), the slope of the curve equals γ. When γ= 1,
π(p)= p, the curve overlaps with the diagonal line, that is, there is
no distortion at all.When γ> 1 and 0< p0 < 1 we see an S-shaped
curve.When 0< γ< 1 and 0< p0 < 1we see an inverted-S-shaped
curve. When the crossover point p0 is set to either 0 or 1, the curve
is no longer S-shaped but simply concave or convex.
This family of functions, with a slightly different parameteriza-
tion, has been previously used to model frequency distortion (Pitz,
1966). In decision under risk or uncertainty, it has been used to
model probability distortion (Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987; Tver-
sky andFox,1995;Gonzalez andWu,1999).A one-parameter form
without the intercept term was ﬁrst used by Karmarkar (1979) to
explain the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953). Following Gonzalez and
Wu (1999) we refer to this family of functions as “LLO.”
The LLO function we use is just one family of the functions that
can capture the S-shaped transformations. Prelec (1998) proposed
another family of functions, which, in most cases, are empirically
indistinguishable from the LLO function (Luce, 2000). We return
to this point below.
The present paper is organized into four sections. In
Section “Ubiquitous Log Odds in Human Judgment and Deci-
sion,” we demonstrate good ﬁts of the LLO function to fre-
quency/probability data in a wide variety of experimental tasks.
We retrieved data for p and π from tables or ﬁgures of published
papers and re-plotted them on the log odds scales. The parameters
(γ and p0) and goodness-of-ﬁt (R2) of the LLO ﬁt are shown on
each plot. We see dramatic differences in γ and p0 across tasks
and individuals. We are concerned with two questions: how can
we explain the LLO transformation? What determines the slope
γ and crossover point p0? We address these two questions in the
following sections.
We conducted three experiments to investigate the factors that
inﬂuence γ and p0. We report them in Section “What Controls
the Slope and the Crossover Point?” The task we used was to
estimate the relative frequency of a category of symbols in a
visual display. We observed systematic distortions of relative fre-
quency consistent with the LLO function and identiﬁed several
factors that inﬂuence γ and p0. We discuss the results in the
light of recent ﬁndings in decision under risk, especially those
in the name of “decision from experience” (Hertwig et al., 2004;
Hau et al., 2010).
Although no attempts have been made to explain the various
S-shaped distortions of frequency/probability in one theory, there
are quite a few accounts for the distortion in one speciﬁc task
or area. In Section “Previous Accounts of Probability Distortion,”
we review these theories or models and contrast them with the
empirical ﬁndings summarized in Sections “Ubiquitous Log Odds
in Human Judgment and Decision” and “What Controls the Slope
and the Crossover Point?”
In Section “LLO as the Human Representation of Uncertainty,”
we argue that log odds is a fundamental representation of fre-
quency/probability used by the human brain. The LLO transfor-
mation in various areas is not coincidence but reﬂects a common
mechanism to deal with uncertainty.
UBIQUITOUS LOG ODDS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND
DECISION
We now demonstrate that the subjective frequency/probability in
a wide variety of tasks can be ﬁtted by the LLO function with two
parameters γ and p0. In the accompanying ﬁgures, we plot sub-
jective frequency/probability versus true frequency/probability on
log odds scales. On these scales the LLO function is a straight line
with slope γ and crossover point p0. Black dots denote data points.
The blue line denotes the LLO ﬁt. When you read the plot, note
how different γ and p0 can be for different tasks or individuals.
These plots pose quantitative tests for any theory that is aimed at
accounting for probability distortions.
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FIGURE 3 | Linear in log odds fits: frequency estimates.The two data
sets in Figures 1A,B are re-plotted on log odds scales as (A,B),
respectively. The blue line is the best-ﬁtting LLO ﬁt. R2 denotes the
proportion of variance accounted by the ﬁt. The S-shaped distortions of
frequency/probability on linear scales in Figures 1A,B are well captured by
the LLO ﬁts.
FREQUENCY ESTIMATION
We introduced Attneave (1953) earlier as an example of overesti-
mation of small relative frequency and underestimation of large
relative frequencies. In his experiment, participants estimated the
relative frequency of each letter in written English (Figure 1A).
While a linear ﬁt could only account for 63% of the variance, the
LLO function ﬁtted to the same data transformed in Figure 3A
accounts for 77% of the variance.
Note that the relative frequency of even themost common letter
(“e”) is less than 0.15. Intriguingly, the estimated crossover point
pˆ0, 0.044, for Attneave’s (1953) data is not far from 1/26 (=0.039),
the reciprocal of the number of letters in the alphabet. We return
to this point later.
Another impressive example is Lichtenstein et al. (1978). Par-
ticipants were given a list of 41 possible causes of death in the US,
such as ﬂood, homicide, and motor vehicle accidents (MVA). Par-
ticipants were asked to estimate the frequencies of the causes. The
true frequency of one cause was provided to participants as a refer-
ence. One group of participants was provided with the frequency
of Electrocution (1000) as the reference and a second group, the
frequency of MVA (50000). We divided the true frequencies and
estimated frequencies (averaged across participants) by the US
population (2.05× 108) to obtain the relative frequencies, p and
π. We noticed that although some speciﬁc causes were unreason-
ably overestimated relative to others (e.g., ﬂoods were estimated
to take more lives than asthma although the latter is nine times
more likely), the overestimation or underestimation of relative
frequency of all causes as a whole can be satisfactorily accounted
by the LLO function. Figure 4A shows the LLO ﬁts for the two
groups.
In the above two examples, participants’ estimation of fre-
quency was based on their memory of events (e.g., reading of
a case of lethal events on the newspaper). To show the LLO trans-
formation is not unique to memory nor to sequential presentation
of events, our third example is Varey et al. (1990), which demon-
strates an LLO transformation in frequency estimation from one
visual stimulus. The task was to estimate the relative frequency of
either black or white dots among an array of black and white dots.
White dots were always less than half of the total number of dots.
Eleven levels of relative frequency were used. Participants reported
the relative frequency immediately after they saw the visual dis-
play. Varey et al. (1990) found considerable distortion of relative
frequency. Figure 4B shows the LLO ﬁts separately for participants
who estimated the relative frequency of white dots and those who
estimated black dots.
CONFIDENCE RATING
Conﬁdence rating refers to the task where participants estimate
the probability of correctness or success of their own action. For
example, in Gigerenzer et al. (1991), participants answered forced-
choice questions like “Who was born ﬁrst? (a) Buddha or (b)
Aristotle” and then chose for each question how conﬁdent they
were to be correct: 50, 51–60, 61–70, 71–80, 81–90, 91–99, or 100%
conﬁdent. Participants choosing 51–60% were counted to be 55%
conﬁdent about the answer, and so on. Converted to proportion,
the rated conﬁdence is a counterpart of estimated probability, π.
The true probability, p, in the conﬁdence rating task is deﬁned
as the relative frequency to be correct for a speciﬁc choice of
conﬁdence level. We re-plot the representative set condition of
Gigerenzer et al. (1991) Figure 6 in Figure 5A. The slope γ of
the LLO ﬁt is greater than one. That is, an underestimation of
small probability (the probability of the harder task) and overes-
timation of large probability (the probability of the easier task). A
qualitative description of this phenomenon is usually referred as
a hard–easy effect. This pattern is the reverse of that of the above
examples of frequency estimation tasks. We discuss this difference
later.
Gigerenzer et al. (1991) is an example of human conﬁdence on
a cognitive task. Similar LLO transformations are found in conﬁ-
dence ratings in motor tasks. McGraw et al. (2004) required par-
ticipants to attempt basketball shots and give a conﬁdence rating
before each attempt. Their results are re-plotted as Figure 5B.
DECISION UNDER RISK OR UNCERTAINTY
A classical task of decision under risk is to choose between two
gambles or between one gamble and one sure payoff. Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979) proposed that the subjective probability
used in decision-making, a.k.a. the decision weight function2, is a
non-linear function of the probability stated in the gamble.
Based on their choices between different gambles and different
sure payoffs, participants’ decision weight (a counterpart of π) for
any speciﬁc stated probability (p) can be estimated. In Figures 1B
and 3B, we re-plot the decision weight for gains of Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) against stated probability on linear scales and
log odds scales. The LLO ﬁt explains 97% of the variance, with
γ= 0.60 and p0 = 0.40.
The data presented in most decision-making studies are aver-
aged across participants. As an exception,Gonzalez andWu (1999)
elicited decision weights for each individual participants. We
2We use the generic term “probability distortion” to refer to non-linear transfor-
mations of probability in different kinds of task. In decision under risk, the term
“probability weight function” or “decision weight function” would coincide with
what we refer to as probability distortion.
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FIGURE 4 | Linear in log odds fits: frequency estimates from memory
or perception. Estimated relative frequency is plotted against true relative
frequency on log odds scales and ﬁtted by the LLO function. Black dots
denote data. The blue line denotes the LLO ﬁt. R2 denotes the proportion
of variance accounted by the ﬁt. (A) Estimated frequency of lethal events
from Lichtenstein et al. (1978). Participants were asked to estimate the
number of occurrences of different causes of death per year in the US.The
actual frequency of one cause was provided as a reference for participants
to estimate the frequencies of the other causes. The relative estimated
and actual frequencies in the plot were the frequencies divided by the
then US population. Left: when the frequency of Electrocution (1000) was
given as reference. Right: when the frequency of MVA (motor vehicle
accident, 50000) was given as reference. (B) Estimated frequency of
visual stimuli from Varey et al. (1990). The task was to estimate the relative
frequency of black or white dots among a visual array of black and white
dots. The proportion of black dots was larger than the proportion of white
dots. Two groups of participants respectively estimated the relative
frequency of white dots (small p) and black dots (large p). Left: the white
dots group (p ≤0.5) was estimated. Right: the black dots group (p ≥0.5)
was estimated.
re-plot their results on log odds scales in Figure 6A. Each panel
is for one participant. The large individual differences are impres-
sive. The slope γ ranges from 0.17 to 0.82, with a median of 0.30.
The crossover point p0 ranges from 0.26 to 0.98, with a median of
0.46. The only common point across participants seems to be that
all the slopes are lesser than one.
When the probabilities of possible consequences of a decision
are known, it is decision under risk. When the probabilities are
unknown, it is decision under uncertainty. Tversky and Fox (1995)
compared probability distortions in decision under risk versus
uncertainty. We re-plot their Figures 7–9 on log odds scales in
Figure 6B. In the left panel (decision under risk), the probability
associated with a gamble, p, was explicitly stated. In the middle
and right panels (decision under uncertainty), the probability p
was the probability of a speciﬁc event in Super Bowl or Dow-Jones
and came from participants’ own judgments. Similar probability
distortions are revealed in the three panels.
SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY
Signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966/1974) is an appli-
cation of statistical decision theory (Blackwell and Girshick, 1954)
to deciding whether a signal is present. In each trial, the observer
makes the decision based on her perception of the stimulus. There
are four possible outcomes: hit (correctly say “yes” at signal pres-
ence), miss (incorrectly say “no” at signal presence), false alarm
(FA, incorrectly say “yes” at signal absence), and correct rejection
(CR, correctly say “no” at signal absence). If each outcome is asso-
ciated with a speciﬁc payoff and the prior probability of a signal
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FIGURE 5 | Linear in log odds fits: confidence rating for cognitive and
motor responses. Estimated probability of being correct or successful is
plotted versus the actual probability on log odds scales and ﬁtted by the
LLO function. Black dots denote data. The blue line denotes the LLO ﬁt. R2
denotes the proportion of variance accounted by the ﬁt. (A) Estimated
probability of being correct in general-knowledge questions from
Gigerenzer et al. (1991). Participants ﬁrst chose an answer for two
alternative general-knowledge questions and then indicated the probability
that the answer was correct. (B) Estimated probability of success in
basketball shooting from McGraw et al. (2004). Participants rated their
probability of success before each basketball shot.
is known, there exists an optimal decision criterion, maximizing
expected gain. This decision criterion is determined by the prior
probability of signal and the speciﬁed rewards.
Based on the relative frequencies of hit, miss, FA, and CR, the
actual decision criterion used by the observer can be measured
and the experiment can compare the subject’s decision criterion
with the optimal criterion. Systematic deviations from the opti-
mal decision criterion have been found in many studies (Green
and Swets, 1966/1974; Healy and Kubovy, 1981). It is as if par-
ticipants overestimate the prior probability when it is small and
underestimate the prior probability when it is large.
InFigure 7,we plotTanner et al.’s (Green andSwets,1966/1974)
data from an auditory signal detection task for one participant on
log odds scales. Each data point is obtained from a block of 600
trials with a speciﬁc probability of signal present. The straight line
is the LLO ﬁt. The slope γ of the probability distortion is 0.36.
In a cognitive signal detection task where participants were
asked to classify a number into two categories with different means
(Healy and Kubovy, 1981), a similar slope, 0.30, was found.
SUMMARY
At this moment, you are probably intrigued by the same two ques-
tions as the authors are: why does probability distortion in so
many tasks conform to an LLO transformation? What determines
the slope γ and crossover point p0?
The plots we present here reﬂect only part of the empirical
results we have reviewed. To provide a more complete picture, we
clarify the following two points.
First, the slope γof the LLO transformation is not determined
by the type of task. The slope γ of the same task can be less than
one under some conditions and greater than one under others, not
to mention the quantitative differences. For example, the typical
distortion in relative frequency estimation is an overestimation
of small relative frequency and underestimation of large relative
frequency, corresponding to γ< 1. But in a visual task that resem-
bles Varey et al. (1990), Brooke and MacRae (1977) found the
reverse distortion pattern: an underestimation of small relative
frequencies and overestimation of large relative frequencies.
In decision-making under uncertainty, a reversal is reported
in Wu et al. (2009), where the probability of a speciﬁc outcome is
determined by the variance of participants’ own motor errors. The
reverse distortion pattern is also implied in a variant of the clas-
sical task of decision under risk called “decision from experience”
(Hertwig et al., 2004; Ungemach et al., 2009), in which partici-
pants acquire the probability of speciﬁc outcomes by sampling the
environment themselves. We will go into more details in the next
section.
Second, the crossover point of the LLO transformation is not
determined by the type of task, either. See the difference between
Attneave (1953) and Lichtenstein et al. (1978).
Luce (2000, Section 3.4.1–3.4.2) discusses the form of the prob-
ability weighting function noting that it is not always S-shaped but
can be a simple convex or concave curve. As we noted above, LLO
with the crossover point set to 0 or 1 can generate such shapes.
While the LLO family provides good ﬁts to all of the data we
have obtained, a two-parameter form of Prelec’s model of the
probability weighting function (Prelec, 1998; Luce, 2000, Section
3.4) also provides good ﬁts (not reported here). We concentrate
on LLO primarily because of the ready interpretability of its para-
meters and its links to current work on the neural representation
of uncertainty discussed below. As Luce (2000) notes, it is difﬁcult
to discriminate competing models of the probability weighting
function in decision under risk by their ﬁts to data.
WHAT CONTROLS THE SLOPE AND THE CROSSOVER POINT?
What controls the slope γ and crossover point of the LLO trans-
formation in a speciﬁc task? In this section we report three new
experiments on frequency/probability distortions.
Gonzalez and Wu (1999) identiﬁed some of the factors that
make decision under risk a less than ideal paradigm for studying
distortions in probability. The most evident is that analysis of data
requires simultaneous consideration of probability distortion and
valuation of outcomes.
The task we consider here is estimation of the relative frequency
of one color of dot among a crowd of two or more colors of dots,
a task used by Varey et al. (1990) and other earlier researchers
(Stevens and Galanter, 1957). The task is illustrated in the two
displays on Figure 8A which consists of 200 (left) or 600 (right)
dots placed at random. In both cases, 20% of the dots are black.
The observer viewed brieﬂy presented arrays like these and judged
the relative frequency of black dots (alternatively, white dots). We
varied the true relative frequencies from trial to trial and ﬁt the
estimated relative frequencies against the true relative frequencies
with the LLO function to obtain γ and p0. We compared γ and p0
across conditions.
EXPERIMENT 1: SLOPE
In earlier studies on frequency estimation, some researchers found
that small relative frequencies are overestimated and large relative
frequencies underestimated (Stevens and Galanter, 1957; Erlick,
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FIGURE 6 | Linear in log odds fits: decision under risk or uncertainty.
Decision weight is plotted versus experimenter-stated probability (in decision
under risk) or self-judged probability (in decision under uncertainty) and ﬁtted
by the LLO function. Black dots denote data. The blue line denotes the LLO
ﬁt. R2 denotes the proportion of variance accounted by the ﬁt. (A) Decision
weights of individual participants from Gonzalez andWu (1999). Each panel is
for one participant. Participants chose between a two-outcome lottery and a
sure reward. The probability of winning the larger reward of the lottery was
stated as p. Decision weight, the counterpart of subjective probability π, was
inferred from each participant’s choices based on the Cumulative Prospect
Theory. Re-plotted from Figure 6 of Gonzalez andWu (1999). (B) Decision
weights fromTversky and Fox (1995). Participants chose between a lottery
offering a probability of a reward or otherwise zero and a sure reward. The
probability of winning the larger reward of the lottery p was stated (left panel),
or estimated by participants themselves as the probability of a speciﬁc Super
Bowl prospect (middle panel), or as the probability of a speciﬁc Dow-Jones
prospect (right panel). Decision weight, the counterpart of subjective
probability π, was inferred from participants’ choices based on the Cumulative
Prospect Theory Re-plotted respectively from Figures 7–9 of Tversky and Fox
(1995).
1964; Varey et al., 1990) while others found no distortion or
even the reverse distortion (Shuford, 1961; Pitz, 1966; Brooke
and MacRae, 1977). Different researchers obtained contradictory
results even when the task they used was almost the same (e.g.,
Erlick, 1964; Pitz, 1966). Expressed in the language of LLO, it is a
controversy about the slope γ. There is clue in the literature that
the numerosity of samples might play a role.
In Experiment 1, participants estimated the relative frequency
of either black or white dots among black and white dots. Each
participant completed eight blocks. We examined the effects of
two factors on γ and p0: experience (block number) and sample
numerosity, N, the total number of dots in a trial, which could be
200, 300, 400, 500, or 600.
Methods
Participants. Eleven participants, seven female and four male,
participated. Six of them estimated the relative frequency of
black dots, the remaining ﬁve, white. One additional partici-
pant was excluded from the analysis because of marked inaccu-
racy. All participants gave informed consent and were paid $12/h
for their time. The University Committee on activities involving
human subjects (UCAIHS) at New York University approved the
experiment.
Apparatus and Stimuli. Stimuli were black and white dots dis-
played on a gray background. They were presented on a SONY
GDM-FW900 Trinitron 24′′ CRT monitor controlled by a Dell
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FIGURE 7 | Linear in log odds fit: signal detection theory. Estimated
probability of signal present is plotted against the true probability on log
odds scales for one participant. Black dots denote data. The blue line
denotes the LLO ﬁt. R2 denotes the proportion of variance accounted by
the ﬁt. In Tanner et al. (1956), c.f. Green and Swets (1966/1974), participants
were asked to report whether a sound signal was present or absent.
Estimated probability was inferred from the participant’s decision criterion
based on signal detection theory. Data are fromTable 4-1 of Green and
Swets (1966/1974).
Pentium D Optiplex 745 computer using the Psychophysics Tool-
box (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). A chinrest was used to help
maintain a viewing distance of 40 cm. The dots were randomly
scattered uniformly within a 17˚× 17˚ area at the center of screen.
Each dot had a nominal diameter of 0.26˚.
Procedure. On each trial the display of black and white dots was
presented for 1.5 s. Participants were asked to estimate the relative
frequency of black or white dots. Their estimates were numbers
between 1 and 999 interpreted as their estimate of relative fre-
quency out of as 1000. Each participant made estimates for only
one color of dots (black or white) and the color assigned to each
participant was randomized. Participants were encouraged to be
as accurate as possible. No feedback was given.
Trials were organized into blocks of 100 trials. In each block all
of the relative frequencies 0.01, 0.02, . . ., 0.99 except 0.50 occurred
once and 0.50 occurred twice. The total number of dots (numeros-
ity, N ) in a display could be 200, 300, 400, 500, or 600, with each
numerosity occurring in 20 trials of each block. Their order within
a block was randomized. Each participant completed two sessions
of four blocks on two different days, completing a total of two ses-
sions× four blocks× 100 trials= 800 trials. Before the ﬁrst block
of each session there were ﬁve trials of practice.
Results
Effect of experience. The experimental blocks were numbered
from 1 to 8 in order. We refer to block index as experience. We
ﬁtted the estimated relative frequency to Eq. 1 separately for each
participant and each block and then averaged the coefﬁcients γ
and p0 across the 11 participants.
Starting from slightly less than one, the slope γ became shal-
lower with experience (Figure 8B), dropping by 16% from Block
1 (0.91) to Block 8 (0.76). A repeated-measures ANOVA showed
a signiﬁcant effect of experience on γ, F(7,70)= 5.59, p < 0.0001,
η2p = 0.36. Post hoc analyses using Tukey’s honestly signiﬁcant
difference criterion at 0.05 signiﬁcance level indicated that Block
1 had a signiﬁcantly larger γ than all the other blocks except
Block 2.
The crossover point p0 ﬂuctuated around 1/2 (0.5) in all
the blocks, ranging from 0.42 to 0.55. According to a repeated-
measures ANOVA, p0 did not vary signiﬁcantly across blocks,
F(7,70)= 0.69, p = 0.68, η2p = 0.06. We concluded that expe-
rience affected the slope parameter γ but not the crossover
point p0.
Effect of sample numerosity. We used a similar procedure to
analyze the effect of sample numerosity as we used in the effect of
experience above.
As sample numerosity increased, the slope γ declined
(Figure 8C). The γ for displays of 600 dots (0.73) was 18% smaller
than that of 200 dots (0.88). A repeated-measures ANOVA showed
a signiﬁcant effect of sample numerosity on γ, F(4,40)= 17.71,
p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.64. Post hoc analyses using Tukey’s honestly
signiﬁcant difference criterion at 0.05 signiﬁcance level indicated
signiﬁcant decline from 200 to all the larger numerosities, and
from 300 to 500 and 600.
Moreover, the relationship of γ to N can be best ﬁtted with a
function with one-parameter C :
γ = log C/log N (4)
A least-squares ﬁt of Eq. 4 captured 99% of the variance of γ
(Figure 8D). The estimate for the parameter C was 104.
The crossover point p0 was 0.50, 0.54, 0.51, 0.68, 0.68, respec-
tively for the numerosity of 200, 300, 400, 500, 600. Similar to
experience, the effect of sample numerosity failed to reach signiﬁ-
cance, F(4,40)= 2.17, p = 0.08, η2p = 0.18. To conclude, we found
that sample numerosity affected the γ but found only a marginally
signiﬁcant effect of sample numerosity on p0.
EXPERIMENT 2: CROSSOVER POINT
What determines the crossover point p0? In Experiment 1, p0 was
around 0.5 and little affected by experience or sample numeros-
ity. But recall that the estimation of the relative frequency of the
26 English letters (Attneave, 1953) ends up with p0 = 0.044, very
different from 0.5 and coincidently not far from 1/26. Fox and
Rottenstreich, 2003; See et al., 2006) suggested that when there are
m categories, the crossover point should be p0 = 1/m.
Experiment 2 was focused on testing the prediction of
p0 = 1/m. The results of Experiment 1 were consistent with the
prediction where there were two categories of dots, black and
white. In Experiment 2, we set m= 4 (participants were asked
to estimate the relative frequency of a speciﬁc color among four
colors of dots).
Methods
Participants. Ten participants, nine female and one male, par-
ticipated. None had participated in Experiment 1. All reported
normal color vision and passed a color counting test. All subjects
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FIGURE 8 | Slope of distortion in relative frequency estimation.The
methods and results of Experiment 1. (A) Examples of the relative frequency
task: what proportion of the dots are black? The left display contains 200 dots
in total, the right, 600. In both displays, 20% of the dots are black. (B) Effect
of experience. The mean slope γ across 11 participants is plotted against block
index, one to four for the ﬁrst session, ﬁve to eight for the second session.
Later blocks are supposed to be associated with more experience. More
experience led to greater distortion (γ further from 1). Error bars denote SEs
of the mean. (C) Effect of sample numerosity. The slope γ across 11
participants is plotted as a function of sample numerosity N (the total number
of dots displayed in a trial). Larger sample numerosity resulted in greater
distortion (γ further from 1). Error bars denote SEs of the mean. (D)The
function of the mean γ to sample numerosity, N. Dots denote data. Solid line
denotes the ﬁt of γ as proportional to the reciprocal of log N.
gave informed consent and were paid $12/h for their time. The
UCAIHS at New York University approved the experiment.
Apparatus and stimuli. The same as Experiment 1, except that
dots could any of four colors, red, green, white, or black.
Procedure. In each trial a display of black, white, red, and green
dots were presented for 3 s. Afterward one of the four colors was
randomly chosen and participants were asked to estimate the rel-
ative frequency of dots of this speciﬁc color. As in Experiment 1,
participants input a number between 1 and 999 as the numerator
of 1000 and no feedback was given.
In any trial, the relative frequencies of the four colors were
multinomial-like random distributions centered at (0.1, 0.2, 0.3,
0.4) and each relative frequency was constrained to be no less
than 0.02. The order of relative frequencies for different colors
was randomized. The total number of dots in a display could be
400, 500, or 600, each numerosity occurring in 32 trials of a block.
Each participant completed one session of ﬁve blocks. That is, ﬁve
blocks× 96 trials= 480 trials in total.
Results
Fox and Rottenstreich, 2003; See et al., 2006) suggested the
crossover point of 1/m but reasoned that it is because people are
using a“guessing 1/m”when they are totally ignorant of the relative
frequency. In our case, because the to-be-estimated color was indi-
cated after the display of dots, there is a good chance participants
might fail to encode the color in question.
In an attempt to further test the “guessing 1/m” heuristic, we
considered an additional measure. The preferred response of a
participant was deﬁned as the value (rounded to the second digit
after the decimal point) that the participant used most often in
estimation. The actual relative frequencies in all trials were close
to uniformly distributed within the range of [0.06, 0.36] and had
a much lower density outside. If on some proportion of trials
observers defaulted to the ﬁxedprior value 0.25, as suggested by the
heuristic, we would expect to ﬁnd a “spike” in observers’ estimates
of relative frequency at that value.
For each participant, we left out the trials whose estimated rel-
ative frequencies were within preferred response ± 0.04 and ﬁt the
remaining trials to Eq. 1 to get the crossover point.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience January 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 1 | 8
Zhang and Maloney The representation of uncertainty
FIGURE 9 | Evidence for log odds as an inherent representation of
uncertainty. Participants saw pairs of photos of faces. One group of
participants rated the similarity between the two faces in each pair. A second
group judged whether the two persons on each pair were related or not. (A)
The similarity rating of two children faces is a linear transformation of the log
odds of the two children being judged to be related. Reproduced from
Maloney and Dal Martello (2006). (B)The similarity rating of two adult faces is
a linear transformation of the log odds of the two adults being judged to be
related. Reproduced from DeBruine et al. (2009). R2 denotes the proportion
of variance accounted by the linear ﬁt. See text for implications.
For the 10 participants, we computed the mean and 95% con-
ﬁdence interval separately for crossover point and for preferred
response. The crossover point was 0.22± 0.07, indistinguishable
from 1/4 (0.25). Note that it was much lower than 0.5. If this were
the result of the“guessing 1/4”heuristic,wewould expect a positive
correlation between crossover point and preferred response. How-
ever, no signiﬁcant correlation was detected, Pearson’s r = 0.29,
p = 0.42. Moreover, the preferred response was 0.18 ± 0.06, lower
than 1/4 (0.25).
We concluded that the prediction of p0 = 1/m, was supported,
but it was unlikely to be the result of the heuristics discussed above.
EXPERIMENT 3: SLOPE AND DISCRIMINABILITY
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) con-
jecture that the shape of the probability weighting function is
controlled by the “discriminability” of probabilities. In Experi-
ment 3, we tested the “discriminability hypothesis” for relative
visual numerosity judgments.Wemeasured the just noticeable dif-
ference (JND) of relative frequency at 0.5 for the ﬁve numerosities
used in Experiment 1. If the shallower slope for a larger sample
numerosity is caused by a lower discriminability (as consistent
with the intuition that a larger numerosity makes the estimation
task more difﬁcult), we would expect that the JND increases with
an increasing numerosity.
Methods
Participants. Ten participants, seven female and three male,
participated. None had participated in Experiment 1 or 2. One
additional participant was excluded for failing to converge in the
adaptive staircase procedures we used to measure JND.All subjects
gave informed consent and were paid $12/h for their time. The
UCAIHS at New York University approved the experiment.
Apparatus and stimuli. Same as Experiment 1.
Procedure. Oneach trial twodisplays of black andwhite dotswere
presented, each for 1.5 s, separated by a blank screen of 1 s. Half of
the participants judged which display had a higher proportion of
black dots, and the other half, white dots.
As in Experiment 1, the total number of dots (numerosity, N ) in
a display could be 200, 300, 400, 500, or 600. The two displays in a
trial always had the same numerosity. To avoid participants com-
paring the number of black or white dots of the two displays rather
than judging the proportion, we jittered the actual numerosity of
each display randomly within the range of ±4%.
The proportion of black or white dots of one display was ﬁxed
at 0.5. The proportion of the other was adjusted by adaptive stair-
case procedures. For each of the ﬁve numerosity conditions, there
was one 1-up/2-down staircase of 100 trials, resulting in 500 trials
in total Each staircase had multiplicative step sizes of 0.175, 0.1125,
0.0625, 0.05 log unit, respectively for the ﬁrst, second, third, and
the remaining reversals. The ﬁve staircases were interleaved. Five
practice trials preceded the formal experiment.
Results
The 1-up/2-down staircase procedure converges to the 70.7% JND
threshold. For eachparticipant andnumerosity condition,we aver-
aged all the trials after the ﬁrst two reversals to compute the thresh-
old. The mean threshold across participants was 0.57, 0.57, 0.56,
0.56, 0.55, respectively for the numerosity of 200, 300, 400, 500,
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600. According to a repeated-measures ANOVA, there was no sig-
niﬁcant difference in the JND threshold for different numerosities,
F(4,36)= 2.05, p = 0.11, η2p = 0.18. Differences in discriminabil-
ity are not responsible for the differences in probability distortion
observed in Experiment 1.
DISCUSSION
As demonstrated in Section “Ubiquitous Log Odds in Human
Judgment and Decision,” the distortions of relative frequency
and/or probability in a variety of judgment and decision tasks are
closely approximated by a linear transformation of the log odds
with two parameters, the slope γ and crossover point p0 (LLO,
the Eq. 1). We investigated in three experiments what determines
these two parameters of the distortion of relative visual frequency.
In Experiment 1 we found that slope γ decreased with increas-
ing experience or larger sample numerosity. Intuitively, these
trends are surprising, because an accumulation of experience or
a larger sample size should reduce “noise” and thus lead to more
accurate estimation. Interesting, the slope γ was proportional to
the reciprocal of log N. We cannot ﬁnd a satisfactory explanation
for these effects in the literature. However, there is a parallel sam-
ple numerosity effect emerging in an area of decision under risk.
We explore the implications under the subtitles below.
In both Experiment 1 and 2 we found that the crossover point
p0 agrees with a prediction of p0 = 1/m. Our results are consistent
with the category effect found in Fox and Rottenstreich, 2003; See
et al., 2006), but we also showed that this is unlikely to be due to
the “guessing 1/m” heuristic they suggested.
Decisions from experience
Recently, research on decision-making has begun to focus on how
the source of probability/frequency information affects probabil-
ity distortion. This new research area contrasts “decision from
experience” (Barron and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Hadar
and Fox, 2009; Ungemach et al., 2009; for review, see Rakow and
Newell, 2010), to traditional “decision from description.”
What are the implications of our results for decision from
experience? A typical ﬁnding in decision from experience is an
underweighting of small probabilities (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004),
as opposed to the overweighting of small probabilities in decision
from description (Luce, 2000). Several authors (Hertwig et al.,
2004; Hadar and Fox, 2009) conjectured that this reversal is due
to probability estimates based on small samples. Consistent with
their conjecture, Hau et al. (2010) found that the magnitude of
underweighting of small probabilities decreased as sample size
increased. With a very large sample size, Glaser et al. (in press)
even obtained the classical pattern of an overweighting of small
probabilities.
In the language of LLO, the larger the numerosity (sample size),
the shallower the slope of the probability distortion (underweight-
ing small probabilities corresponds to a slope of over one). Note
that this effect of sampling size on the probability distortion in
decision from experience qualitatively parallels to what is found in
Experiment 1. And according to Eq. 4, the empirical ﬁt we found
for γ, when N =C, there would be no probability distortion. We
conjecture that for decision from experience, there exists a speciﬁc
sample size at which there is no distortion of probability.
There is another hint in the literature that the highly ordered
changes in probability distortion that we observe in visual
numerosity tasks would also show up in decision-making tasks
where probability information is presented as visual numeros-
ity. Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) asked participants to choose
between two bowls ﬁlled with jelly beans, one large (100 jelly
beans) and one small (10 jelly beans). Participants were explic-
itly told the proportion of winning jellybeans in both bowls by
the experimenters but they still showed a strong preference for
the large bowl with 60% of participants choosing a large bowl
with 9/100 winning jellybeans over a small bowl with 1/10 win-
ning jellybeans. This outcome suggests an effect of numerosity
qualitatively consistent with our results.
We have also shown that we can systematically manipulate
the crossover point p0 in a relative visual numerosity task. The
crossover point is often assumed not to vary in decision-making
under risk (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Tversky and Fox, 1995;
Prelec, 1998). Our results lead to the conjecture that, in decisions
with relative frequency signaled by displays with m > 2 categories,
the crossover point will vary systematically.
Conﬁdence ratings
Gigerenzer (Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Gigerenzer, 1994) distin-
guished between human reasoning about single-event probability
and frequency. When asked to rate their conﬁdence about one
event, people’s default response was to treat the event as a special
one that never occurred before and will never occur after, rather
than to group the event into a category of events whose frequency
is observable.
Probability distortion in conﬁdence rating typically has a slope
of γ> 1 (see Figure 5), as reversed to the typical pattern in fre-
quency estimation and decision-making. We conjecture this to be
a special case of the sample numerosity effect. That is, γ> 1 when
the sample numerosity is very small. It was as if people treat the
to-be-rated action as a single-event and sampled very few previous
events to making the conﬁdence rating.
PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS OF PROBABILITY DISTORTION
Why do humans distort frequency/probability in the ways that
they do? The subjective probability may deviate from the true
probability for many reasons, but no simple reason can explain
the S-shaped patterns we have observed.
For example, people might overestimate the frequencies of
the events that attract more media exposure (Lichtenstein et al.,
1978) or are just more accessible to memory retrieval (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974). But this would not cause a patterned
distortion of all events. People might be risk-averse in order to
maximize biological utility (Real, 1991), or just be irrationally risk-
seeking, but neither risk-averse nor risk-seeking tendencies could
explain the coexistence of overestimation and underestimation of
probabilities.
The S-shaped distortion has received much attention in quite
a few areas. Theories and models have been developed to account
for the S-shaped distortion in a speciﬁc area, although little efforts
have been made to build a uniﬁed theory for all the areas. In
this section, we brieﬂy describe the representative theories and
models, organizing them by area. Their predictions, quantitative
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or qualitative, on slope, and crossover point of the distortion are
compared with the empirical results we summarized in Sections
“Ubiquitous Log Odds in Human Judgment and Decision” and
“What Controls the Slope and the Crossover Point?”
FREQUENCY ESTIMATION
Power models
Spence’s (1990) power model and Hollands and Dyre’s (2000)
extension of it, the cyclical power model, are intended to explain
the S-shaped patterned distortion in proportion judgment. Pro-
portion here refers to the ratio of the magnitude of a smaller
stimulus to the magnitude of a larger one on a speciﬁc physi-
cal scale, such as length, weight, time, and numerosity. Relative
frequency can be regarded as the proportion of numerosity.
The basic assumption is Stevens’ power law: the perceived mag-
nitude of a physical magnitude, such as the number of black dots
in a visual array of different colors of dots, is a power function
of the physical magnitude with a speciﬁc exponential. We apply
the power assumption to the estimation of relative frequency as
below. Suppose among N dots, there are n1 black dots and n2
other colors of dots. The perceived numerosity would be nα1 and
nα2 , respectively. Accordingly, the estimated relative frequency of
black dots is:
π = n
α
1
nα1 + nα2
(5)
Dividing both the numerator and denominator of the right side
by N α, we get the perceived relative frequency as a function of the
true relative frequencies:
π
(
p
) = p
α
pα + (1 − p)α (6)
It is easy to see this is a variant of LLO (substitute Eq. 6 into Eq. 1)
which predicts γ= α and p0 = 0.5. Thus an S-shaped distortion
follows the assumption of Stevens’ power law.
Hollands and Dyre (2000) assumed that the slope of the distor-
tion of the proportion of a speciﬁc physical magnitude depends
on the Stevens exponent of the physical magnitude. For instance,
length, area, and volume have different Stevens exponential but
the exponent of each of them is ﬁxed. This prediction has some
difﬁculties in applying to the estimation of relative frequency. The
experiment we reported in Section “What Controls the Slope and
the Crossover Point?” would imply that the exponent is not ﬁxed
and changes systematically with the total numerosity.
As to the crossover point, Hollands and Dyre (2000) treated it
as an arbitrary value, depending on the reference point available
to the observer at the time of judgment. This is not consistent
with our observation that p0 = 1/m, where m is the number of
categories.
Support theory
Tversky et al.’s support theory (Tversky and Koehler, 1994; Rot-
tenstreich and Tversky, 1997) concerns how humans estimate
the probability of speciﬁc events. The term degree of support
refers to the strength of evidence for a hypothesis. The estimated
probability of an event is the degree of support for the presence
of the event divided by the sum of the degrees of support for the
presence and absence of the event.
To explain the inverted-S-shaped distortion of relative fre-
quency, Fox and Rottenstreich, 2003; See et al., 2006) added two
assumptions to support theory. First, they assumed that the orig-
inal degree of support for both the presence and absence of an
event are proportional to the corresponding frequencies. Second,
before transforming the degree of support into probability, the log
odds of degree of support is linearly combined with a prior log
odds and the coefﬁcients of the two add up to 1. Following these
two assumptions, the resulting estimated probability has the same
form as the LLO function.
The value of the prior probability was the crossover point. Fox
and Rottenstreich, 2003; See et al., 2006) called this prior the
ignorance prior, echoing the human tendency for equal division
when in total ignorance of probability information. It follows that
p0 = 1/m.
However, the weighted addition of a true log odds and a prior
log odds would lead to a γ never greater than 1, unless the prior log
odds has a negative weight. Therefore, it cannot explain the γ> 1
cases (Shuford, 1961; Pitz, 1966; Brooke and MacRae, 1977).
The slope of the distortion equals the weight assigned to the
true log odds in the combination. Fox and Rottenstreich, 2003;
See et al., 2006) suggested that it is positively correlated with the
conﬁdence level of the individual who makes the estimation. We
consider next model of the distortion of conﬁdence ratings.
CONFIDENCE RATINGS
Calibration model
The calibration model of Smith and Ferrell (1983) attributes the
probability distortion in conﬁdence rating to a misperception of
one’s ability todiscriminate between correct and incorrect answers,
or between successful and unsuccessful actions.
The calibration model borrows the framework of signal detec-
tion theory. Correctness and wrongness of an answer, or success
and failure of an action, are considered as two alternative states, i.e.,
signal present and absent. The observer’s conﬁdence, is assumed
to be have a constant mapping to the perceived likelihood ratio
of the two states. If the discriminability between the two states
is perceived to be larger than the true value, small probabilities
would be underestimated and large probabilities overestimated,
amounting to γ> 1 (as in Figure 5). If the discriminability were
underestimated, the reverse pattern would show up.
The calibration model does not necessarily lead to an LLO
transformation and does not have any speciﬁc predictions for the
selection of slope and crossover point.
Stochastic model
Erev et al., 1994; Wallsten et al., 1997) propose that the over-
and under-conﬁdence observed in conﬁdence ratings are caused
by stochastic error in response. They assume that at a speciﬁc
time for a speciﬁc event, the participant experiences a degree of
conﬁdence and translates this experience into an overt report of
conﬁdence level by a response rule. The experienced degree of
conﬁdence is the log odds of the true judgment plus a random
error drawn from a Gaussian distribution. The larger the variance
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of the random error, the greater the slope of probability distortion
deviates from one.
With some speciﬁc response rules, the S-shaped distortion can
be produced. The predictions of the stochastic model are not
intuitive and are illustrated in their computational simulation.
One of the predictions states that the underestimation of small
probability and overestimation of large probability (i.e., the γ> 1
pattern) widely identiﬁed in conﬁdence rating tasks, a seemingly
reverse pattern of regression-to-the-mean, is actually a kind of
regression-to-the-mean phenomenon disguised by the way how
the true probability is deﬁned. The true probability in the conﬁ-
dence rating task is usually deﬁned as the actual success rate of
a speciﬁc conﬁdence level. That is, successful and unsuccessful
actions are grouped by participants’ conﬁdence rating. Wallsten
et al. (1997) re-analyzed previous empirical studies and show that
if, instead, the true probability of success is computed for each
action as an average across participants, the γ> 1 pattern would
be obtained.
However, we doubt this effect of true probability deﬁnition can
apply to the conﬁdence rating data of McGraw et al. (2004), in
which the γ> 1 pattern holds even when the success rate of bas-
ketball shot is grouped by the distance to the basket rather than by
participants’ conﬁdence rating (not shown in Figure 5B).
DECISION UNDER RISK OR UNCERTAINTY
Adaptive probability theory
Martins (2006) proposed an adaptive probability theory model to
explain the inverted-S-shaped distortion of probability in deci-
sion under risk. The observed distortions, under this account,
reﬂect a misuse of Bayesian reference. In everyday life, people
observe the frequency of a speciﬁc event in ﬁnite samples of events.
The observed relative frequency of the event, even in the absence
of observation errors, may deviate from the true probability of
the event due to the random nature of sampling. To reduce the
inﬂuence of sampling error, Martin assumes that people intro-
duce a prior sample and combines it with the observed sample by
Bayes’ rule. The resulting estimated probability would be a linear
combination of the observed frequency and the prior probability,
determined by three parameters: the size of the imagined sample
n, the frequency of the event in the prior sample a, the frequency
of the other events in the prior sample b. But Martins (2006) did
not characterize what controls these parameters or motivate the
choice of prior. Martins (2006) further argued that, in the exper-
imental condition, in front of a lottery, e.g., a probability of 0.1
to win $100, participants treat the probability stated by the exper-
imenter not as a true probability, but as an observed frequency
from an imagined sample. The decision weight was the result of
the Bayesian inference for the true probability.
The involvement of a prior could explain why the estimated
probabilities shrink toward a center. However, for any speciﬁc n,
instead of a S-shaped transform, the estimated probability would
be a linear function of the observed relative frequency, To over-
come this difﬁculty, Martins (2006) assumes that sample size n
changes with the observed relative frequency, greater for extreme
probabilities and less for smaller probabilities. Thus, the parame-
ter n is actually not one-parameter and is chosen arbitrarily to
make theory conform to data.
Another difﬁculty that adaptive probability theory encounters
is the underweighting of small probability observed in studies of
decision from experience (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004). Although
Martins (2006) did not suggest the theory could be applied to
decisions where the probability information comes from sam-
pling, there is no obvious reason that people would not make
the Bayesian inference with a real sample.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this article we examined probability distortion in human judg-
ment and the factors that affect it. An evident direction for future
research is to develop process-based models of human use of
probability and frequency information. The theories and mod-
els we reviewed above are among those that use speciﬁc cognitive
processes to explain the emergency of the S-shaped distortion of
probability (other examples include Stewart et al., 2006; Gayer,
2010, to name a few). While a full treatment of them is beyond
the scope of the current paper, it would be interesting to see
whether any existing process-based models can be modiﬁed to
account for the changes in slope and crossover point we have
summarized.
LLO AS THE HUMAN REPRESENTATION OF UNCERTAINTY
We conjecture that log odds to be a fundamental representation
of frequency/probability used by the human brain. Here are a few
pieces of evidence.
PEOPLE ARE LESS BIASED WHEN RESPONDING IN LOG ODDS
Phillips and Edwards (1966) asked participants to estimate the
probability of one hypothesis to be correct among two alternative
hypotheses. There were two types of bags of poker chips, differing
in their proportions of red chips and blue chips. Participants were
informed the proportions. They were given random draws from
one bag and were asked to estimate the probability of each type of
bag the sample came from. Participants responded with devices in
the format of probability, log probability, or log odds. Phillips and
Edwards found that when responding in log odds, participants had
the least deviation from the correct answer.
SIMILARITY RATING AMOUNTS TO READING OUT LOG ODDS
Maloney and Dal Martello (2006) provided evidence of the
involvement of log odds in kinship perception. Participants saw
pairs of photos of children faces. The task of one group of partici-
pants was to judge for each pair whether the children were siblings
or not. The task of the other group was to rate the similarity
between the two faces shown in each pair. The similarity rating of
a pair proved to be proportional to the log likelihood ratio of the
pair to be and not to be sibling (Figure 9A). It is as if participants
were reading out the log likelihood ratio when required to rate the
similarity of two faces. DeBruine et al. (2009) replicated this result
several times using young adult faces (Figure 9B).
A PLAUSIBLE NEURAL REPRESENTATION OF LOG ODDS
Gold and Shadlen (2001, 2002) propose a computational mecha-
nism for neurons to represent the likelihood ratio of one hypothe-
sis against another. Consider the binary decision whether hypoth-
esis h1 or hypothesis h0 is true. Assume there is a pair of sensory
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neurons:“neuron”and“antineuron.”The ﬁring rate of “neuron,”x,
is a random variable whose distribution is conditional on whether
h1 or h0 is true. So does the ﬁring rate of “antineuron,” y. The
random distribution of y conditional on h1 is the same as the
random distribution of x conditional on h0, and vice versa. For
many families of random distributions, such as Gaussian, Poisson,
and exponential distributions, Gold and Shadlen prove that the
log likelihood ratio of h1 to h0, is a linear function of the ﬁring
rate differences between “neuron” and “antineuron,” x− y. While
Gold and Shadlenwere concernedwithmaking a decision between
two alternatives, their proposed neural circuit can potentially be
taken as a representation of uncertainty of frequency in log odds
form. That is, the log odds can be encoded by two neurons as the
difference between their ﬁring rates.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Log odds has been independently developed to ﬁt psychophysical
data in many areas of perception and cognition over the course of
many years. As early as 1884, Peirce and Jastrow (1885) speculated
that the degree of conﬁdence participants gave to their sensation
difference judgments was proportional to the log odds of their
answers being right. Pitz (1966) used the linear log odds function
as a convenient way to ﬁt the data of estimated frequency to true
frequency.
In the decision area, Karmarkar (1978, 1979) used a one-
parameter linear log odds function to model decision weights.
Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) modiﬁed Karmarkar’s equation
to include the intercept parameter, which was followed by later
researchers (Tversky and Fox, 1995; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Kilka
and Weber, 2001).
For signal detection theory, it is a common practice to plot
the actual decision criterion against the optimal decision criterion
in the log scale (Green and Swets, 1966/1974; Healy and Kubovy,
1981). It amounts to our log odds plot and the observed distortion
of probability is referred to as “conservatism.”
We are seeking for a general explanation for the linear transfor-
mation of log odds in these various areas. No matter how different
these tasks look like, they are connected by the same evolution-
ary aim: using possibly imperfect probabilistic information to
make decisions that lead to the greatest chance of survival. It is
therefore surprising, at ﬁrst glance, that organisms systematically
distort probability. It is doubly surprising that the same pattern of
distortion (LLO) is found across a wide variety of tasks.
A full explanation of the phenomena just described would
require not only that we account for the form of the distortion but
also for the large differences in the values of the two parameters
across tasks and individuals and the factors that affect parameter
settings. The key question that remains is, then, what determines
the slope and crossover point of the linear log odds transforma-
tion? We found that in one task we could identify experimental
factors that controlled both the slope and crossover point of the
LLO transformation of perceived relative numerosity. We conjec-
ture that there are factors in eachof thedomainswe considered that
are responsible for the particular choice of probability distortion
observed. We need only ﬁnd out what they are.
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